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FLYING IN THE FACE OF SUSPICIONLESS CELL PHONE
SEARCHES: FOURTH CIRCUIT GRANTS AIRLINE
PASSENGERS HEIGHTENED PROTECTION FROM
SEARCHES BY CUSTOMS OFFICERS
ANDREA

DELORIMIER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

I

NTERNATIONAL TRAVELERS ARE aware that airport customs officers may search their personal property.1 However,
most travelers do not know that officers have the power to mine
every piece of data stored in their cell phones, even if there is no
reason to suspect the passenger of criminal activity.2 Given that
many Americans believe cell phone searches implicate privacy
rights “comparable to that of strip searches and body cavity
searches,”3 it is imperative that travelers’ cell phones be granted
heightened Fourth Amendment protections. The Fourth Circuit
mirrored this sentiment in United States v. Kolsuz.4
In Kolsuz, the court held that a forensic examination of a cell
phone at the airport must be categorized as a nonroutine border search and can only be conducted upon a showing of reasonable suspicion.5 The court did not reach the question of
whether the search required more than reasonable suspicion,
such as a warrant based on probable cause, because the officers
were acting in reasonable reliance on established law.6 This casenote argues that the Fourth Circuit’s classification of a forensic
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2020; B.A., Texas A&M
University, May 2017. I would like to thank the SMU Law Review Association for
this opportunity and my parents for their encouragement and support.
1 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 967 (9th Cir. 2013).
2 Id.
3 Matthew B. Kugler, Comment, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic
Devices at the Border: An Empirical Study, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (2014).
4 890 F.3d 133, 146 (4th Cir. 2018).
5 Id. at 146–47.
6 Id. at 147.
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border search as nonroutine was a step in the right direction.7
However, given the serious privacy interests at stake, the court
should have taken the opportunity to resolve the question of
whether a forensic border search requires customs officers to
have more than reasonable suspicion. The answer to this question is “accordingly simple—get a warrant.”8
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 2, 2016, Turkish citizen Hamza Kolsuz arrived at
Dulles International Airport in Virginia for a flight to Turkey.9
Customs officers examined his checked luggage and discovered
he was carrying unregistered firearm parts in violation of federal
law.10 The officers brought Kolsuz to a secondary inspection
area where they conducted a “manual” search of his iPhone 6,
which consisted of browsing his recent calls and text messages.11
After completing the manual search, officers transported Kolsuz’s phone from the airport to the Homeland Security Investigations office (located four miles away) where an agent
conducted a “forensic” search of the phone’s data.12 This search
lasted for a full month and resulted in an 896-page report of
Kolsuz’s “personal contact lists, emails, messenger conversations, photographs, videos, calendar, web browsing history, and
call logs, along with a history of Kolsuz’s physical location down
to precise GPS coordinates.”13
Kolsuz was indicted on three counts: attempting to export
firearms without a license, attempting to smuggle goods from
the United States, and conspiracy to commit these offenses.14
Kolsuz moved to suppress the report generated by the forensic
search of his phone, arguing that the forensic search constituted
a nonroutine border search and required a warrant based on
probable cause.15
See id. at 146.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
9 Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 139.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 A forensic search consists of attaching the cell phone to a “Cellebrite Physical Analyzer,” which extracts data from the device. Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 139–40.
7
8
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The district court agreed with Kolsuz that the forensic search
must be classified as nonroutine.16 However, the court rejected a
warrant requirement, stating that no court to date had required
a warrant for nonroutine border searches and that even the
most invasive nonroutine border searches have been justified on
a reasonable suspicion standard.17 The court convicted Kolsuz
of all three counts.18
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment typically requires law enforcement
officials to obtain warrants based on probable cause prior to
searching individuals’ private possessions.19 However, at the border—or the border’s functional equivalents, such as international airports—officers can conduct routine searches without
“any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or
warrant.”20 Although routine border searches require no level of
suspicion, the Supreme Court, through a series of cases involving airport security, recognized a category of highly intrusive
“nonroutine” searches that are permitted only if accompanied
by individualized suspicion.21 In order to determine whether a
border search qualifies as nonroutine, the Supreme Court implemented a balancing test: weighing a search’s “intrusion on
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests.”22 For example, highly
invasive searches of the person, searches that are carried out in a
“particularly offensive” manner, and searches that are destructive to personal property are more likely to be considered
nonroutine and require a level of suspicion prior to searching.23
Courts initially demonstrated a reluctance to classify forensic
searches of digital devices as nonroutine. In United States v. Cotterman, however, the Ninth Circuit held that a forensic search at
Id. at 140.
Id. at 140–41
18 Id. at 141.
19 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
20 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
21 Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 138.
22 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (citing United States v. VillamonteMarquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983)).
23 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 n.2, 155–56 (2004) (stating that there may be searches so “destructive” to personal property as to justify a
level of suspicion); see Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 (holding that officials
at the border must have individualized suspicion in order to conduct a search of
an airline passenger suspected of smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal).
16
17

130

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[84

an airport was nonroutine and required customs officers to have
reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing prior to conducting the search.24 In coming to this conclusion, the court
drew on the sheer quantity of information in cell phones as well
as the “uniquely sensitive” nature of that information.25 Then, in
United States v. Saboonchi, the District Court of Maryland echoed
this analysis, adding that the pervasiveness of cell phones in society renders it neither “realistic nor reasonable to expect the average traveler to leave his digital devices at home when
traveling.”26
In response to the increasing sophistication and omnipresence of digital devices, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Riley v. California.27 In Riley, the Court held that a manual search
of a cell phone seized incident to an arrest (another Fourth
Amendment exception) requires a warrant based on probable
cause.28 As a general premise, the Court held that cell phones
“implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the
search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”29 The Court
noted cell phones’ immense storage capacity, overwhelming
presence in society, and ability to contain many distinct types of
personal information.30 This decision forced lower courts to determine how the Supreme Court’s updated stance on digital privacy would apply to the other Fourth Amendment exceptions,
such as the border search exception.
The Eleventh Circuit was the first federal circuit court to consider “whether a warrant is required to conduct a forensic
search of a cell phone at the border post-Riley.”31 In United States
v. Vergara, the Eleventh Circuit refused to use Riley to inform its
privacy analysis and refuted the idea that border searches
should ever require a warrant or probable cause.32 The dissent,
on the other hand, looked to the Supreme Court’s privacy con24
25
26

United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 964, 966.
United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 556 (D. Md. 2014) (mem.

op.).
See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014).
Id. at 2485.
29 Id. at 2488–89.
30 Id. at 2489–90.
31 Aisha J. Dennis, Riling Up the Border Search Doctrine: Litigating Searches of Digital
Content at Our Ports of Entry, THE CHAMPION 40, 44 (Mar. 2018).
32 United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 70 (2018).
27
28
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siderations in Riley to support its argument that a warrant should
be required.33
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

FORENSIC SEARCHES OF CELL PHONES ARE NONROUTINE
BORDER SEARCHES REQUIRING REASONABLE SUSPICION

In United States v. Kolsuz, the Fourth Circuit held that the forensic search of an international traveler’s cell phone “must be
treated as a nonroutine border search” accompanied by a showing of individualized suspicion.34 In classifying the search as
nonroutine, the court relied primarily on the holdings of various cases that lend support to this conclusion and the Supreme
Court’s confirmation of these cases’ reasoning in Riley.
Judge Harris began the opinion by stating that the question of
whether a border search is nonroutine should be informed by
“how deeply it intrudes into a person’s privacy.”35 With this principle as a guideline, the court noted that multiple courts have
already constructed strong cases for construing forensic
searches of digital devices as nonroutine.36 Specifically, Judge
Harris found the reasoning of Cotterman and Saboonchi compelling, agreeing with these courts that the “unparalleled breadth”
and “uniquely sensitive nature” of cell phones’ information,
coupled with their pervasiveness, lend support to the idea that a
forensic border search cannot be considered routine.37 Turning
to the case at hand, the court found that the forensic search of
Kolsuz’s phone—resulting in a 896-page report of Kolsuz’s personal information—was a “case in point” as to how invasive forensic searches can be.38
The Fourth Circuit did not reach the question of whether anything more than reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic
search of a cell phone.39 Applying the good-faith exception to
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the court ruled that
the officers who conducted the forensic analysis of Kolsuz’s
phone were relying “on the established and uniform body of
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 1317 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146 (4th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 145–46.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id. at 148.
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precedent allowing warrantless border searches of digital devices that are based on at least reasonable suspicion.”40
B.

WHY

THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH

The Fourth Circuit properly held that customs officers must
have reasonable suspicion prior to conducting a forensic border
search of an airline passenger’s cell phone.41 However, given
that the unique “quantitative” and “qualitative” characteristics of
cell phones led the Supreme Court to require a warrant prior to
conducting searches of cell phones seized incident to arrest, it is
peculiar that the Fourth Circuit failed to reach the same conclusion in terms of forensic searches of cell phones at international
airports.42 The court should have seized the opportunity to
bring its argument to its logical conclusion: due to the weighty
privacy concerns at stake during air travel, customs officers must
obtain a warrant based on probable cause prior to conducting a
forensic search of a passenger’s cell phone.
Critics of a warrant requirement believe the government’s interest in protecting the international border is too strong to be
trumped by individual privacy concerns.43 For example, shortly
after Kolsuz was decided, the Eleventh Circuit held that customs
officers do not need any level of suspicion prior to forensically
searching an airline passenger’s cell phone.44 In creating this
circuit split, the court stated that it was “unpersuaded that a traveler’s privacy interest should be given greater weight than the
‘paramount interest [of the sovereign] in protecting . . . its territorial integrity.’”45
Although the government undoubtedly has an interest in airport security,46 a passenger’s privacy interests during international travel are just as strong, if not stronger. Even though
Riley’s analysis of digital privacy rights applies similarly to forensic searches of a cell phone at international airports, there are
multiple reasons why forensic border searches implicate privacy
rights beyond those enumerated by the Supreme Court. First,
Id.
Id. at 145.
42 Id. at 144.
43 See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2018).
44 Id. at 1234.
45 Id. at 1235 (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153
(2004)).
46 Id.
40
41
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cell phones are a practical necessity for air travel.47 Cell phones
not only serve as an airline passenger’s most reliable means of
communication with loved ones while abroad but also have the
capacity to hold an array of crucial travel information, such as
mobile boarding passes, hotel reservations, and travel itineraries. Because cell phones are essential to international flights,
travelers are virtually guaranteed to be carrying their cell
phones if they are subjected to a more invasive search while going through customs.
Second, it is important to highlight the stark differences between manual and forensic searches.48 Riley’s holding pertained
to manual searches, meaning the officers at issue simply scrolled
through the phone’s digital content.49 On the other hand, a customs officer conducting a forensic search is “capable of unlocking password-protected files, restoring deleted material, and
retrieving images viewed on web sites.”50 The Supreme Court
contemplated similar privacy concerns in its discussion of cloud
computing, noting that digital privacy is further compromised
when a search extends beyond data stored on the physical device itself.51 Although forensically searching a phone’s deleted
material differs from searching material stored in the cloud,
both scenarios involve searches in which the owner of the device
does not intend to have the searched data stored on the device.
The implication of this is that an airline traveler who deletes
sensitive information from his phone in anticipation of a search
at the airport is nonetheless at risk of being subjected to a highly
invasive digital search by customs officials. It is likely that the
Supreme Court would hold that this level of privacy invasion is
“like finding a key in a suspect’s pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and search a house.”52
Notwithstanding the significant privacy justifications, a warrant requirement is also a more workable standard than that of
reasonable suspicion. A reasonable suspicion standard requires
customs officers, prior to conducting the search, to point to “a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
47 See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 556–58 (D. Md. 2014)
(mem. op.).
48 See United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 70 (2018).
49 Id. at 1316.
50 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013).
51 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 397 (2014).
52 Id.
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person stopped of criminal activity.”53 Accordingly, even though
Kolsuz offers some protection to the 30,200 international travelers54 who had their cell phones searched by customs officers
last year, airline passengers are still at the mercy of officers who
decide whether to probe a cell phone on a discretionary basis.
On the other hand, a warrant requirement would remove the
threat of officer discretion by requiring them to receive permission prior to conducting a forensic search.55 Requiring a warrant would not only protect passengers but also shield customs
officers from the risk of carrying out a search that later litigation
declares unreasonable.56
Given the substantial digital privacy concerns that are unique
to air travel, the majority’s willingness to defer to Riley’s privacy
analysis, and the workability of the warrant requirement, the
Fourth Circuit failed to take its argument to the logical conclusion. Although an individualized suspicion standard is a step in
the right direction, the court missed an opportunity to hold that
a warrant is required prior to conducting a forensic border
search of a cell phone. Thus, until the Supreme Court rules on
the matter, the status of international airline travelers’ digital
privacy is up in the air because of this circuit split.
53 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981) (setting out the definition of the reasonable suspicion standard).
54 CBP Releases Updated Border Search of Electronic Device Directive and FY17 Statistics, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT. (Jan. 5, 2018) https://www.cbp.gov/news
room/national-media-release/cbp-releases-updated-border-search-electronic-de
vice-directive-and (last modified Jan. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/NMD5-6942].
This is a nearly 60% increase over the number of such travelers in 2016. Id.
55 See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 1609, 1638–39 (2012).
56 See id. at 1641–42.

